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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)0) (2009).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The City agrees with issues one, four and five in Mr. van Frank's opening brief.
The City objects to issues two and three. The trial court's Memorandum Decision did not
determine "that portions of Mr. van Frank's declaration are not properly supported for
purposes of summary judgment." The Memorandum Decision also did not "determine^
that a letter written by the Director of the City's Building Services Division . . . is
hearsay."
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court simply recited the City's contentions
in opposition to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 244-45. It made no
ruling on those contentions. Instead, the court indicated that it would deny Mr. van
Frank's motion based on the parties' factual disputes, but in light of its ruling granting the
i

City's Motion for Summary Judgment, the court held that Mr. van Frank was not entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City does not dispute paragraphs one, three, four and five of Mr. van Frank's
Statement of the Case. The City does dispute paragraph two of Mr. van Frank's

<

Statement of the Case. That paragraph consists of legal argument which has no place in
the statement of the case. It should be stricken, or at the very least, disregarded by this
(

Court.
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1

RESPONSE TO MR. VAN FRANK'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City disputes the following paragraphs of Mr. van Frank's Statement of Facts:
Paragraph 6: It is understood by Mr. van Frank and admitted to by the City that the
permit was conditionally denied by the Division based upon Mr. van Frank's calculations
but subsequently approved without change to the plans.
RESPONSE: This Statement of Fact is only partially correct. The part of the
record to which Mr. van Frank cites in support of this statement (R. 53) is the second
page of the City's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. The
fifth paragraph of the statement of facts in the City's Motion states "Mr. Buchanan's
application for a building permit was denied, at least in part, because the City required a
structural engineer's opinion regarding certain calculations made by van Frank in his
drawings and/or certifying the safety of the building design."
Paragraph 7: The Division made a determination that Mr. van Frank's
calculations exceeded the scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed an architect
under state law and the Division required Mr. Buchannan to provide the opinion of a
structural engineer to certify the accuracy of Mr. van Frank's calculations.
RESPONSE: Again, this Statement of Fact is only partially correct. It is true that
the City required the opinion of a structural engineer before it would approve Mr.
Buchannan's building permit application. The remainder of this paragraph has no
support whatsoever in the record. The only part of the record cited by Mr. van Frank (R.
53) that has any bearing on this statement of fact is paragraph 6, which states "Mr.
Buchannan obtained the required opinion of a structural engineer certifying that the floor
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,2may contain errors.

system designed by Mr. van Frank was safe." At no time in this litigation has Mr. van
Frank ever cited to any admissible evidence in the record to support his allegation that the
Division made any determination of any kind regarding Mr. van Frank's licensure as an
architect, the scope of practice allowed Mr. van Frank under state licensing law, or took
any action whatsoever regarding his architect's license. At most, the factual record
demonstrates that the Division required the opinion of a structural engineer to certify the
safety of the proposed building design before it would approve Mr. Buchanan's
application for a building permit.
Paragraph 9: A year prior to doing work for Mr. Buchanan, Mr. van Frank
contracted with a Mr. Thomas to perform architectural work. It is the understanding of
Mr. van Frank that the Division conditionally denied a building permit submitted by Mr.
Thomas on grounds similar to the Buchanan permit. This understanding is confirmed by
a letter received by Mr. van Frank from Orion Goff, director of the Division, explaining
the grounds for the denial of the permit. The letter states that the Division's staff made a
"judgment call" based on Utah Administrative Rule 156-3a-102 that Mr. van Frank's
work exceeded the scope of incidental engineering work allowed an architect.
Response: The letter ("Goff Letter" R. 87-89) referenced by Mr. van Frank is
hearsay, it discusses a totally different project for a totally different client, and was
written one year prior to the events at issue in this litigation. This letter has no relevance

<

to the issues before the court on summary judgment. Further, Mr. van Frank never
disclosed this letter to the City prior to opposing the City's summary judgment motion,
i
and he cannot rely on it in his attempt to defeat summary judgment. Finally, Mr. van
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Frank's assertions regarding the relevance of this letter to the issues in this litigation are
conclusory, and based solely on "understandings," "inferences" and "assumptions." This
letter should be stricken, or at the very least, disregarded by the Court.
Paragraph 10: After the Division denied the permit, Mr. Buchanan obtained the
opinion of a structural engineer, which certified that the calculations made by Mr. van
Frank were, in fact, accurate and safe.
Response: As stated in the City's Response to Paragraph 7, the factual record
demonstrates, at best, that "Mr. Buchannan obtained the required opinion of a structural
engineer certifying that the floor system designed by Mr. van Frank was safe." R. 53.
Paragraph 11: The Division then issued Mr. Buchanan's permit, requiring no
alteration of Mr. van Frank's plans, once the engineer's opinion confirmed the
engineering calculations that Mr. van Frank included on the plans.
Response: See Response to Paragraph 10.
Paragraph 14: State law also provides that DOPL has exclusive authority to make
determinations as to whether an architect's engineering work is incidental to the practice
of architecture.
Response: This is a statement of legal opinion, not fact. As such, it has no place
in a statement of undisputed fact. Further, this statement of fact is irrelevant to the issues
before this Court. The statutory provision cited is limited to action taken on a
professional license, not to municipal decisions made in conjunction with an application
for a building permit.
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Paragraph 15: The regulation cited in Mr. Goff s letter was adopted by DOPL,
expressly and solely for its use.

?

Response: See the City's Responses to Paragraphs 9 and 14.
Paragraph 17: Nothing in Title 18 or elsewhere in the City Ordinances grants the
Division authority to determine or make judgment calls as to whether an architect
exceeded the permissible scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed a licensed
architect under Utah law.
Response: This is a statement of legal opinion, not fact. As such, it has no place
in a statement of undisputed fact. It is also argumentative. See also the City's Responses
to Paragraphs 7, 9 and 14.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in the City's favor. In order to
hold a municipality liable for civil rights violations, a plaintiff must allege and prove the
existence of a municipal policy, custom or practice which contributed to the alleged
i

constitutional violation. Mr. van Frank apparently conflates the two distinct concepts of
alleging the existence of a municipal policy, practice or custom, versus proving the
existence of such a policy, practice or custom. Here, Mr. van Frank not only failed to

i

allege the existence of such a policy in this Complaint, he further failed to prove the
existence of a policy.

<

Mr. van Frank's civil rights claims further fail because no due process violation
occurred. The City did not attempt to suspend or revoke Mr. van Frank's license as an
i
architect, nor has it ever taken any action against Mr. van Frank's licensure status with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DOPL. It appears that the basis for Mr. van Frank's claims stem from a claimed right to
the approval of his plans in connection with his client's application for a building permit.
However, Utah case law is clear that municipal land use decisions and planning disputes
are primarily a matter of local government concern and do not implicate the Constitution.
Cities are entitled to exercise discretion in interpreting land use statutes, ordinances and
rules. Due to the complexity of factors involved and the necessary application of
specialized knowledge to the circumstances in land use matters, a city's land use
decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference.
Mr. van Frank has no right or entitlement to the approval of his plans, calculations,
or the building permit application of his client. His allegations do not amount to any
deprivation or inability to practice architecture. His disagreement with the City merely
involves a dispute about the design details of his client's application, and in no way
deprives him of any constitutionally protected property right. Being an architect is an
occupation; having the state-granted privilege to also engage in the incidental practice of
engineering is not. Here, Mr. van Frank has not been foreclosed form practicing
architecture.
Mr. van Frank was not entitled to due process in the permit application process.
He has no legitimate claim of entitlement of approval of a building permit. Further, City
Code provided Mr. van Frank with the ability to appeal the City's decision, an
opportunity he declined to take advantage of. Under state law, a person may not
challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision until that person has
exhausted his administrative remedies.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The code sections and administrative rules cited by Mr. van Frank in support of
his claims do not apply to the City in the land use context. His allegations, by his own
admission, are based upon his "understanding" and "assumption" of the grounds for the
City's conditional denial of the building permit. Understandings and assumptions are not
admissible evidence, and are insufficient to create a material issue of fact in opposition to
summary judgment. No admissible evidence exists that even suggests that the City took
any action with regard to Mr. van Frank's licensure as an architect.
Mr. van Frank erroneously claims that the trial court determined that the Goff
Letter was inadmissible hearsay, and that his declaration was not properly supported for
the purposes of summary judgment. The trial court made no such determinations. The
trial court merely noted the City's objections to Mr. van Frank's use of these documents
in opposition to summary judgment, but it did not rule on those objections. Indeed, the
trial court did consider the Goff Letter, over the City's objections, in reaching the
conclusion that it did not constitute evidence of a City policy.
The trial court properly denied injunctive relief. Mr. van Frank failed to
demonstrate a realistic probability of the same injurious conduct in the future. Setting
forth only two occasions among the thousands of other land use decisions made by the
City, and with respect to the universe of other licensed architects whose clients may seek
a building permit from the City, was insufficient to meet the required demonstration.
Even if Mr. van Frank could establish standing for injunctive relief, he would fail on the
merits pursuant to the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 65 A(e).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Finally, the trial court was correct to deny Mr. van Frank's request for a new trial
or for reconsideration. Based on the reasons set forth above, and in light of the trial
court's ruling, the motion was not well-taken substantively. Procedurally it was properly
denied because post-judgment motions for reconsideration have been absolutely rejected
in Utah. Here, Mr. van Frank's memorandum simply rehashed arguments already raised
and argued to the trial court, requested that the trial court "reconsider" its summary
judgment ruling seven different times, while mentioning a new trial only once. It did not
apply or analyze any of Rule 59's provisions.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN THE CITY5 S FAVOR.
A.

MR. VAN FRANK NEVER ALLEGED THE EXISTENCE OF ANY
CITY POLICY, PRACTICE OR CUSTOM THAT CONTRIBUTED
IN ANY WAY TO THE ALLEGED CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS.

In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that municipalities and their employees may be held liable for civil
right violations only when a plaintiff alleges and can demonstrate "the action that is
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at
690-91. In Monell and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has "required a plaintiff
seeking to impose liability on a municipality to identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom'
that caused the plaintiffs injury." Bd. Of County Coram 'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403
(1997); Allison v. Utah County Corp., 335 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1318 (D.Utah 2004).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In his brief, Mr. van Frank conflates the two distinct concepts of alleging the
existence of a municipal policy, practice or custom, versus proving the existence of such
a policy, practice or custom. Here, the trial court properly found that he failed to allege
the existence of any City policy, as required under federal law to assert a § 1983 claim
against a municipality. Nowhere in Mr. van Frank's Amended Complaint does he allege
the existence of any City policy, practice or custom that contributed in any way to any
claimed constitutional violation. Because he failed to allege the existence of a City
policy in his Amended Complaint, all of his efforts to demonstrate that he proved the
existence of a City policy avail him nothing. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep 7 ofSoc. Svcs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978); Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1259 (10th Cir. 2007); Myers
v. Okla. County Bd. OfCommrs., 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1998).
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court properly determined that Mr. van
Frank never alleged in his Complaint that any policy, practice or custom of the City led to
the claimed constitutional violations. It was not until he filed his memorandum opposing
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment that he claimed the existence of a City policy
based on a letter written by Orion Goff one year prior to the events at issue in this
litigation. This letter had never been disclosed to the City prior to opposing summary
judgment, and it had absolutely nothing to do with the facts and circumstances of the
present lawsuit. Even though this letter was hearsay, irrelevant and inadmissible, the trial
court did not explicitly exclude it from consideration. Instead, the trial court found that at
most, Mr. van Frank was alleging that the City made decisions on two occasions that he
exceeded the scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed an architect under state
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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law, but that these two decisions did not constitute a deprivation of his right to practice
his occupation as an architect. The court's determination that Mr. van Frank failed to
state a claim should be affirmed.
B.

MR. VAN FRANK FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.

Mr. van Frank fails to identify any federal Constitutional or statutory basis for his
allegations and causes of action. In conclusory and general terms, he claims that his
rights to "due process" have been violated based on alleged violations of state law and
administrative rules. It is clear, however, that "[a]n action under § 1983 . . . cannot be
maintained on the basis of alleged violation of state law," including a violation of a state
constitutional right. Stanko v. Maher, 419 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2005); Becker v.
Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 917 (10th Cir. 2007); Redwood Professional Plaza, L.C v. City of
West Jordan, 2009 WL 1408217, case no. 1:07-CV-153TC (D. Utah 2009).
While the basis for his constitutional claims are not entirely clear, Mr. van Frank
apparently demands judgment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not create any
substantive rights by itself. Rather, it provides a remedy for violation of an existing
federal Constitutional or statutory right caused by an action taken under color of state
law. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). To state a valid claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove two elements: (1) that defendant has
deprived him of a right secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States, and
(2) that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right under "color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory." Trujillo v. Goodman,
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825 F.2d 1453, 1456-7 (10th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). "Where a right or immunity
created by the Constitution or laws of the United States is an essential element of the
cause of action, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to adequately and properly allege
jurisdictional facts according to the nature of the case." Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877,
879 (10th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly held that "section 1983 imposes liability for
violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care
arising out of tort law." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979). Tort claims such
as interference with business relations and defamation, which are essentially what van
Frank alleges here, do not give rise to any cause of action for violation of due process
under § 19831. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
711-12 (1976); Kenman Engg v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 481 (10th Cir. 2002).
C.

NO DUE PROCESS VIOLATION OCCURRED

Even if this Court determines that Mr. van Frank did properly allege and prove the
existence of a municipal policy, his claims still fail because the City did not violate his
due process rights under the state or federal constitutions.
L

NO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY
RIGHT IS AT STAKE,

The "property right" asserted by Mr. van Frank is not entirely clear. While he
claims that the City has denied him the "ability to practice his profession" as an architect,
1

Even if there were a § 1983 cause of action for defamation, it would be barred here by
Utah's one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2302(4). Mr. van Frank alleges actions that occurred in June of 2007, and his Complaint
was not filed until September 12, 2008.
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it is undisputed that the City did not revoke or suspend his architect's license. The City
has no such authority. It is further undisputed that the City has taken no action
whatsoever with regard to Mr. van Frank's licensure status with DOPL. To the best of
the City's knowledge, Mr. van Frank is still a licensed architect. Any property right he
has to practice his profession has not been deprived by the City in any manner.
Rather, it appears that Mr. van Frank claims a property right in the approval of his
plans and engineering calculations, which were attached to his client's application for a
building permit. Denial of the application, according to Mr. van Frank, requires the City
to provide him an opportunity to "defend and explain his work before it was arbitrarily
rejected." By "rejecting his plans," the City "denied Mr. van Frank's right to practice
architecture," "damaged van Frank's economic relationship with his client," and
"damaged his reputation."
This argument fails for several reasons. First, to plead a cognizable substantive
due process claim, a plaintiff must allege "sufficient facts to show a property or liberty
interest warranting due process protection." Crider v. Bd. Of County Comm 'rs, 246 F.3d
1285, 1289 (10 Cir. 2001). In the context of due process, property is "a 'legitimate
claim of entitlement' to some benefit." Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226
F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000). Significantly, however, a protectable property interest
is not created by an "abstract need for, or unilateral expectation of, a benefit." Id.
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, "[m]any courts have held that adverse
municipal land-use decisions are not actionable under § 1983 because a developer does
not typically have a claim of entitlement to a favorable decision." Patterson v. American
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Fork City, 2003 UT 7, ^ 24, 67 P.3d 466. A city's rejection of a developer's application
"does not always amount to a violation of section 1983 because every planning dispute
'necessarily involves some claim that the [municipality] exceeded, abused or 'distorted'
its legal authority in some manner . . . It is not enough simply to give these state law
claims constitutional labels such as 'due process' . . . in order to raise a substantial federal
question under section 1983." Id. at ^ 25 (quoting Creative Environments, Inc. v.
Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1 st Cir. 1982). Just as in Patterson, van Frank's claims are
merely a "conventional planning dispute . . . [which] is a matter primarily of concern to
the state and does not implicate the Constitution." Id.
Cities are entitled to exercise discretion in interpreting land use statutes,
ordinances and rules. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-802(2), 10-9a-801, 10-9a-501, 58-568(1), 58-56-20(3)(d); Salt Lake City Code 18.04.030, 18.04.040, 18.08.020, 18.20.040;
Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, 26 P.3d 193; Cottonwood Heights Citizens Assn.
v. Bd. OfCommrs. Of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138 (Utah 1979); Redwood
Professional Plaza v. City of West Jordan, 2009 WL 5195776 (D. Utah 2009). Due to
the complexity of factors involved and the necessary application of specialized
knowledge in land use matters, a city's land use decisions are entitled to a great deal of
deference. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984); Naylor v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966). Indeed, under state law, Utah
courts "shall presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority
of this chapter is valid; and determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or
regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(i) and
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(ii). A City employee's exercise of that lawful discretion does not constitute a municipal
"policy" for § 1983 actions. On this basis alone, Mr. van Frank's claims fail.
Second, Mr. van Frank points to no source of state or local law which entitles him
to approval of his plans/calculations. While state law may allow a licensed architect the
right to engage in the incidental practice of engineering, no authority exists to even
suggest that he has a vested property right in the approval of any such calculations in
support of an application for a building permit. Again, Mr. van Frank's complaints
involve a dispute about local development issues, not the deprivation of constitutional
rights. His complaints do not involve a complete inability to practice architecture. His
disagreement with the City concerning the design details of his architectural plans in no
way deprives him of any constitutionally protected property right.
Further, an architect's state-created "right" to engage in the incidental practice of
engineering is not an occupation; it is, at best, a privilege attached to an occupation.
Limitation of that privilege, without a deprivation of the occupation, is not a deprivation
of any claimed occupational property interest. Being an architect is an occupation;
having the privilege to also engage in the incidental practice of engineering is not. Here,
Mr. van Frank has not been foreclosed from practicing architecture, and he has not stated
a deprivation of any protected property interest under § 1983.
Finally, Mr. van Frank's allegations of damage to his professional reputation and
relationships with clients are not actionable. The United States Supreme Court has held
that damage to reputation alone is not a sufficient interest to establish a claim of denial of
due process under § 1983. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). This type of claim
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is a "classical claim for defamation." Id. at 697. As such, state tort law provides
adequate protection. As the Court has stressed repeatedly, § 1983 was not meant to
federalize state tort law. Id. at 701 (the Due Process Clause is not a "font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States");
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) ("the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.. . does not transform every tort
committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation"). The Tenth Circuit has also
made it clear that damage to "prospective employment opportunities" is too intangible to
constitute a deprivation of a liberty or property interest. Setliffv. Memorial Hosp. of
Sheridan County, 850 F.2d 1384, 1397 n. 18 (10th Cir. 1988). Thus, even if the City's
actions made Mr. van Frank less attractive to current and potential clients, that is
insufficient to state a deprivation of a property interest under § 1983. Id.
jL

MR. VAN FRANK WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS.

For the same reasons stated above, Mr. van Frank was not entitled to procedural
due process. "The deprivation of a procedural right to be heard, however, is not
actionable when there is no protected right at stake." Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18
F.3d 188, 193 (2nd Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). "Process is not an end in itself. Its
constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a
legitimate claim of entitlement." Olimv. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). Mr.
van Frank has no legitimate claim of entitlement to approval of a building permit based
on the drawings, plans and/or engineering calculations he submitted in support thereof.
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Further, City Code provided Mr. van Frank with an opportunity to appeal the
City's decision. Salt Lake City Code 18.20.040 (applications for building permits must
be accompanied by "all required plans, diagrams and other data," and "building official
may require the plans and other data to be prepared and designed by an engineer or
architect licensed by the state to practice as such"); 18.20.140 ("Any person adversely
affected by the action of the building official in accordance with the preceding sections
may appeal to the board of appeals and examiners for a hearing upon such revocation or
denial") (emphasis added). Mr. van Frank apparently declined to avail himself of his
appeal rights under the City Code. Under state law, "[n]o person may challenge in
district court a municipality's land use decision made under this chapter, or under a
regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that person has exhausted the
person's administrative remedies .. ." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l).
Finally, Mr. van Frank has no substantive due process claim. Substantive due
process protects only "fundamental rights," which are "rights created by the
Constitution." Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262
(11th Cir. 2003); see also Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2006)
("Substantive due process claims are not based on state law but are founded upon deeply
rooted notions of fundamental personal interests derived from the Constitution."). The
Due Process Clause "prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the
conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). "The standard forjudging a substantive due
process claim is whether the challenged government action would 'shock the conscience
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

of federal judges/" Livsey v. Salt Lake County, 275 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir. 2001).
"[PJlaintiff must do more than show the government actor intentionally or recklessly
caused injury to the plaintiff by abusing or misusing government power . . . it must
demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that
is truly conscience shocking." Id. (quoting Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. Of Regents, 159
F.3d 504, 528 (10th Cir. 1998).
Mr. van Frank has failed to demonstrate through any competent evidence that the
City's alleged actions in this matter constituted a violation of his substantive due process
rights. Nothing about the facts alleged herein would shock the conscience of any
reasonable person.
]iL

THE CODE SECTIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
CITED BY MR. VAN FRANK DO NOT APPLY HERE. THE
CITY TOOK NO ACTION WHATSOEVER TO ENFORCE
STATE LICENSURE LAWS, OR MADE ANY
DETERMINATION REGARDING MR. VAN FRANK'S
ARCHITECT LICENSE.

The Division's conditional denial of Mr. Buchanan's application for a building
permit was a municipal land use decision. It had nothing to do with Mr. van Frank's
licensure as an architect. Title 58 of the Utah Code, and Utah Administrative Rule R1563a-102, have no application to the City here. Title 58, "Occupations and Professions,"
creates DOPL within the Utah Department of Commerce. U.C.A. § 58-1-103. Among
DOPL's statutory duties is the responsibility for "prescribing, adopting, and enforcing
rules to administer this title." U.C.A. § 58-1-106(1 )(a). Pursuant to this authority, DOPL
adopted R156-1-101 et seq of the Utah Administrative Code. R156-1-103, titled
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"Authority—Purpose," states: "This rule is adopted by the division [DOPL] under the
authority of Subsection 58-l-106(l)(a) to enable the division to administer Title 58."
R156-3a-103, which addresses regulation of architects, states: "This rule is adopted by
the division [DOPL] under the authority of Subsection 58-1-106(1 )(a) to enable the
division to administer Title 58, Chapter 3a." These Rules clearly apply only to DOPL,
not the City.
Mr. van Frank plainly admits that his allegations are based entirely upon his
understanding and assumption that the Division's grounds for conditional denial were
"similar, if not identical to the grounds set forth" in a letter that is totally unrelated to the
facts and circumstances in this case. Understandings and assumptions are not admissible
evidence, and cannot be relied upon to support a summary judgment motion. "Bare
allegations, unsupported by specific facts in support thereof, do not raise material issues
of fact. Massey v. Utah Power and Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980); See also
Briscoe v. Lahue, 663 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1981), affd, 460 U.S. 325 (1983); Davis v.
Lukens, No. 91-1020-K, 1991 WL 126729 (D. Kan. June 12, 1991) (legal conclusions,
deductions, or opinions couched as factual allegations not given any presumption of
truthfulness in determining a motion to dismiss).
The letter relied upon by Mr. van Frank was written a year prior to the events at
issue here, involved a completely different project for a "Mr. Thomas," and has no
relevance whatsoever to the facts and circumstances before this court. It lacks foundation
and is hearsay. Further, even if it were admissible, Mr. van Frank has never disclosed
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this letter to the City, and cannot now rely on it in support of his summary judgment
motion. This letter should be stricken, or at the very least, disregarded by the court.
Similarly, Mr. van Frank concedes that the Division is authorized to question plans
if it has safety concerns, but claims, without support, that no such concerns were
expressed in this matter. This is in direct contradiction with the allegations in paragraphs
9, 13 and 27 of his Amended Complaint2, and his Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 9 in
opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment3. Mr. van Frank further
conceded the City's Statements of Undisputed Fact Nos. 5 and 6 in its summary
judgment Memorandum, which clearly stated that Mr. Buchanan's application for a
building permit was conditionally denied based, at least in part, on safety concerns4.

~ Paragraph 9 of Mr. van Frank's Amended Complaint alleges "In addition to denying the
permit, the Division required Mr. Buchanan or his contractor to provide a structural
engineer's opinion certifying that the calculations shown on the plans were correct and/or
certifying that the design for the floor system was sound," i.e. safe.
Paragraph 13 of Mr. van Frank's Amended Complaint alleges "After discussing
the matter with Plaintiff, the owner, Mr. Buchanan . .. obtained the opinion of a
structural engineer that the floor system designed by Plaintiff was sound and/or that the
calculations Plaintiff had performed accurately showed that the floor system was
adequate to support the loads required to be supported under the building codes."
Paragraph 27 of Mr. van Frank's Amended Complaint alleges "In both instances,
the Defendant failed to conduct any analysis supporting any finding that Plaintiff could
not safely and competently perform the calculations challenged by the Division . . ."
3
Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 9 states "After the denial of the permit by the
Division, Mr. Buchanan obtained the opinion of a structural engineer certifying that the
calculations made by Mr. van Frank were, in fact, accurate and hence safe."
4
The City's Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 5 stated "Mr. Buchanan's application for a
building permit was denied, at least in part, because the City required a structural
engineer's opinion regarding certain calculations made by van Frank in his drawings
and/or certifying the safety of the building design."
The City's Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 6 stated "Mr. Buchanan obtained the
required opinion of a structural engineer certifying that the floor system designed by Mr.
van Frank was safe."
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In conclusory fashion, Mr. van Frank claims that "it is apparent that these plans
were safe and complied with the building code," "the Division must accept plans stamped
by a licensed architect" where there are no conflicts with the building code, the Division
must "pass on any concerns it may have regarding the scope of work done by an
architect" to DOPL, and the Division "exceeded its authority in making its 'judgment
call.'" No admissible facts are provided in support, nor is any legal analysis undertaken.
Contrary to van Frank's conclusory assertions, the City has taken no action with
regard to his licensure as an architect. Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-3a-102, and the
administrative rules enacted pursuant to thereto, have no application here. The City has
not assumed any duties of the Architect's Licensing Board or DOPL. The City's actions,
as alleged here, clearly only pertain to the sufficiency of Mr. Buchanan's application for a
building permit, and have nothing to do with Mr. van Frank's licensure status as an
architect. Mr. van Frank's licensure status with DOPL is entirely unaffected by the
City's denial of Mr. Buchanan's application for a building permit.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXCLUDE THE GOFF LETTER OR MR.
VAN FRANK'S DECLARATION.
Mr. van Frank incorrectly asserts that the trial court determined that the Goff

Letter (R.87-89) was inadmissible hearsay (van Frank Brief, Part II), and that his
declaration (R. 121-24) was not properly supported for the purposes of summary
judgment (van Frank Brief, Part V). The trial court made no such determinations. While
noting in its Memorandum Decision the City's objections to the Goff Letter and Mr. van
Frank's declaration, the court nevertheless proceeded to consider the Goff Letter as
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evidence of the City's land use decisions, not as City policies. R. 240-41. Even if the
Goff Letter was evidence of the City's land use decisions, Mr. van Frank did not allege or
prove the existence of any City policy of depriving a right to practice architecture, and
therefore failed to state a claim for municipal liability. Id.
The same is true for Mr. van Frank's declaration. The trial court noted the City's
objections to the opinions stated in the declaration (R. 244-45), but did not rule on them.
Instead, the court indicated that it "would be compelled to deny Mr. van Frank's motion
on the bases of these factual disputes. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth in
connection with its analysis of the City's motion for summary judgment, it also
determines that as a matter of law, Mr. van Frank is not entitled to summary judgment."
R. 245.
HI.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MR. VAN FRANK'S
REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
The trial court properly found that Mr. van Frank failed to demonstrate a realistic

probability that the City would subject him to the same injurious conduct in the future.
Indeed, Mr. van Frank set forth only two occasions (at best) out of the thousands of other
land use decisions made by the City where he claimed injurious conduct. This was
insufficient to demonstrate a sufficient probability that the City would do so again, both
with respect to Mr. van Frank, and with respect to the universe of other licensed
architects whose clients may seek a building permit from the City.
In addition, even if Mr. van Frank could establish standing for injunctive relief, he
cannot meet any of the requirements for injunctive relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
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65A(e). As the trial court ruled, he has not suffered any cognizable injury under § 1983,
and there is no likelihood of his success on the merits. Further, an injunction against the
City would result in substantial damage to the City and would be adverse to the public
interest. In situations such as this, where the Division has safety concerns about plans
submitted in support of applications for land use permits, the approval process would
grind to a halt if the Division were required to refer all decisions to DOPL. Adequate
protections are already available to any person who is adversely affected by an adverse
decision through the City's appeal process. Salt Lake City Code 18.20.140. Because he
failed to avail himself of his appeal rights, Mr. van Frank cannot now seek judicial relief.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l).

IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED MR. VAN FRANK'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO RECONSIDER.
For all the reasons set forth above, the trial court correctly held that Mr. van
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider was not well-taken substantively. From a
procedural standpoint, it was also properly denied. The Utah Supreme Court has
"absolutely rejected] the practice of filing post-judgment motions to reconsider." Gillett
v. Price, 2006 UT 24, \ 1, 135 P.3d 861. Mr. van Frank's motion, although styled in the
alternative as a motion for a new trial, was in every other respect a motion to reconsider.
Indeed, the text of Mr. van Frank's memorandum in support of his motion specifically
asked the trial court to "reconsider" its ruling on summary judgment seven different
times, while mentioning a "new trial" only once. Mr. van Frank's memorandum did not
cite, or even mention, U.R.C.P. Rule 59 even once. It did not apply or analyze any of
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Rule 59's provisions. "Mere recitation of rule 59 does not convert a motion to reconsider
into a legitimate motion for new trial." Cline v. State of Utah, 2007 UT App 111, 2007
WL 1017372. The total lack of substantive argument compelled the court's conclusion
that the motion did not qualify as a Rule 59 motion.
At the outset of his argument section, Mr. van Frank set forth the wrong standard
for a "Motion to Reconsider." Because his was a postjudgment motion from a final
order, his reliance on Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) was entirely misplaced. Unlike here, the Trembly decision involved a nonfinal order.
Mr. van Frank' motion did nothing more than challenge the district court's
reasoning in its Memorandum Decision. He identified no new case law applicable to the
facts, nor any error of law committed by the trial court that was not already argued on
summary judgment. Instead, he re-hashed the same arguments already presented to the
court, and argued issues of fact, which were not a basis for asserting a Rule 59 motion.
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision denying Mr. van Frank's
Motion to Reconsider.
CONCLUSION

l

This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in the City's
favor. Mr. van Frank never alleged the existence of any city policy, custom or practice

4

that contributed in any way to the alleged constitutional violations. He also failed to
prove the existence of any such policy. No due process violation occurred because Mr.
i
van Frank did not have any constitutionally protected property right at stake, he was not
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entitled to due process in the context of the City's municipal land use decision, and even
if he was, the City Code provided Mr. van Frank with an opportunity to appeal the City's
decision. He declined to do so.
The City took no action whatsoever against Mr. van Frank's licensure as an
architect. The state code sections and administrative rules cited by Mr. van Frank do not
apply to the City's municipal land use decisions. His licensure status with DOPL is
entirely unaffected by the City's denial of Mr. Buchanan's application for a building
permit.
Contrary to his assertions, the trial court did not rule on the sufficiency and/or
admissibility of the Goff Letter or Mr. van Frank's declaration. The trial court's
Memorandum Decision merely noted the City's objections to Mr. van Frank's use of
those documents in opposition to summary judgment, and in support of his own summary
judgment motion.
The trial court correctly denied Mr. van Frank's request for injunctive relief. He
failed to demonstrate a realistic probability that the City would subject him, or anyone
else, to the same injurious conduct in the future. Having set forth only two occasions (at
best) out of the thousands of other land use decisions made by the City, and with respect
to the universe of other licensed architects whose clients may seek a building permit from
the City, the trial court correctly held that he lacked standing to sue for injunctive relief.
In addition, even if he could establish standing, he could not meet any of the
requirements for injunctive relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e).
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Finally, Mr. van Frank's Motion for a New Trial or to Reconsider was properly
denied. The motion was not well-taken, both substantively and procedurally.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Appellee Salt Lake City Corporation
respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary
judgment in its favor.
Dated this

day of July, 2011.

$ [Mi^^A^m, uCffibnJ. WESLEY ROBINSON
/
Senior Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake City Corporation
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